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"marital propeny" under the statute, the
court did not agree. Niroo at 237, 545 A.2d
at 40.
Alternatively, Mr. Niroo aruged that the
trial coun erred in not finding that cenain
debt that he incurred - advances received
in the form of a loan from Penn Life should have been construed as marital
debt, and thus offset against the present
value of the commissions. This would possibly have had the effect of reducing Mrs.
Niroo's monetary award. Although the
court did not agree with Mr. Niroo's calculations, it did agree that the advances
were marital debts and should be offset
against the commissions. Subsequently,
the case was remanded for funher consideration in determining the proper monetary award.
The Niroo coun is splitting judicial hairs
on the definition of marital propeny. It
has determined that the rights to renewal
commissions that vested during the marriage are contractual rights and are, therefore, enforceable as a propeny right rather
than as a mere conditional expectation.
The distinction to be made is that the
court refused to recognize as marital property earnings which were speculative and
nontransferable, such as a medical degree
or license; yet determined that the right to
future earnings that vested during the
marriage were marital property because
they were less speculative and were
transferable.

- Peter T. McDowell

Craig 'V. State: SIXTH AMENDMENT
RIGHT OF CONFRONTATION IS
NOT ABSOLUTE IN Clflm ABUSE

CASES
In Craig v. State, 76 Md. App. 250, 544
A.2d 784 (1988), the Coun of Special
Appeals of Maryland held that the
Maryland statute that allows alleged child
abuse victims to testify over closed circuit
television, if it is determined that testifying
in the courtroom will so traumatize the
child-witness that the child will be unable
to reasonably communicate, does not violate the six amendment's confrontation
clause.
Sandra Ann Craig was the owner and
operator of a pre-kindergarten and kindergarten school in Howard County. Brooke
Etze attended Craig's school for two years,
had never complained to her parents of
any abusive treatment, and her parents had
ex:pressed satisfaction with Craig and her
school. After reading a newspaper account
of complaints of abuse at Craig's school,

Mr. and Mrs. Etze attended a meeting
hosted by Howard County's social services and health departments. As a result of
what they learned at the meeting, the
Etze's had Brooke evaluated by a therapist.
During conversations with the therapist
and her parents, Brooke disclosed several
incidents of abuse committed by Craig,
two of Craig's children, and other children
at the school. It was revealed that "[t]he
direct abuse by Ms. Craig included kicking
Brooke on the legs and in her 'private
parts,' inserting a stick in her vagina, and
threatening her with the loss of her
parents' love." A medical examination
confirmed sexual abuse. Id. at 255, 544
A.2d at 786.
Ultimately, a six-count indictment was
returned in the Circuit Court for Howard
County against Sandra Craig, who was
tried and convicted of all counts in a jury
trial. Craig appealed to the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, raising seven
issues. The court of special appeals found
no merit in any of the complaints and
affirmed the conviction. This article
addresses Craig's complaint that "the
coun erred in allowing the children to testify on closed circuit television" in violation
of
the
sixth
amendment's
confrontation clause. Id. at 257, 544 A.2d
at 786.
The trial coun applied section 9-102 of
the Maryland Courts and Judicial Proceedings Code in allowing Brooke and several
other children to testify during the trial
through closed circuit television. Md. Cts.
& Jud. Proc. Code Ann. § 9-102 (1984).
Section 9-102 provides that in a case of
child abuse, the coun may allow a child's
testimony taken outside the counroom in
a child abuse trial if "(i) the testimony is
taken during the proceeding and (ii) the
judge determines that the child testifying
in the counroom will result in the child
suffering serious emotional distress such
that the child cannot reasonably communicate." Id. at 275, 544 A.2d at 786. Craig's
complaint was in effect a three-part issue.
She contended that section 9-102 "violate[d] her Constitutional right of confrontation; (2) the coun failed to follow the
proper procedure in concluding that the
children would suffer serious emotional
distress such that they would be unable to
reasonably communicate if required to testify in coun; and (3) '" § 9-102 ... violated her right of presence." Id.
The Craig trial court did not have the
benefit of an appellate decision concerning
the construction of section 9-102. Consequently, the main thrust of Craig's attack
focused on Wildermuth v. State, 310 Md.
496, 530 A.2d 275 (1987), which was decided after her verdicts were rendered.

Wildermuth concerned a challenge that the
procedure stated in section 9-102 contravened a defendant's right of confrontation
and presence. However, subsequent to
Wildermuth, the U.S. Supreme Coun
decided Coy v. Iowa, __ U.S. __,108
S. Ct. 2798 (1988), which also "addressed
the confrontation issues raised by pr~
dures impairing face-to-face contact
between child-witnesses and defendants on
trial for having allegedly abused them." 76
Md. App. at 275-76, 544 A.2d at 796.
In Coy, the defendant was charged with
having assaulted two 13-year old girls. The
trial judge, without inquiring whether the
assaulted children would be able to testify
in Coy's presence and acting pursuant to a
recently enacted state statute, permitted a
semi-opaque screen to be placed in the
courtroom between the witness stand and
Coy. Coy was able to dimly see the
witnesses but the witnesses were not able
to see him. The state had sought to justify
the procedure on the ground that there
was a legislatively imposed presumption of
trauma, thereby avoiding a specific finding
of necessity for separating the victims
from the defendant. The state also argued
that there was no violation of Coy's right
to confrontation since his right of crossexamination was left intact. Id.
Justice Scalia authored the Supreme
Court's majority decision that rejected the
state's two arguments. The Court held that
the right of confrontation required more
than just the ability to cross-examine but
also included the right to meet one's accuser face-to-face. Additionally, the Coun
rejected the state's contention that its statute could, on its own, supply the necessity, and stressed the lack of individualized
findings. Nevertheless, the Court did not
completely rule out exceptions to this finding, but simply stated that the question of
whether any exceptions may exist would
have to wait for another day. Id. at 27&-77,
544 A.2d at 797. In the concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor made clear, however, that the face-to-face confrontation
requirement was "not absolute but rather
may give way ... to other competing
interests so as to permit the use of certain
procedural devices to shield a child witness
from the trauma of courtroom testimony." Id. at 278, 544 A.2d at 797-98
(quoting Coy, __ U.S. at - > 108 S. Ct.
at 2803).
The Craig court concluded that the Coy
Court did not firmly rule out exceptions
to the face-to-face confrontation clause
requirement nor did it rule out as an exception a state's interest in protecting childwitnesses from being traumatized while
testifying in a courtroom in the presence of
the defendant. The court noted that, even
though Justice Scalia's opinion may have
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suggested ":hat a closed circuit television
arrangemem based on a 'case-specific finding of nece..sity' would be regarded as
impermissible under the Confrontation
Clause, that view was not shared by more
than four of the justices who sat on the
case." Id at 280, 544 A.2d at 798.
Therefore, the Craig court felt compelled by necessity to decide the issue of
exceptions to the confrontation clause that
the Supreme Court had chosen to reserve
for another day. The court, taking guidance from the Court of Appeals' of
Maryland analysis in Wildermuth and following Justice O'Connor's lead in her concurring opinion in Coy, held that:
(1) the requirement of a face-to-face
meeting in court is not absolute, but
does admit of exceptions; (2) where a
face-to-face meeting would, in fact, so
traumatize a child-witness as to prevent him or her from reasonably communicating, the State may provide for
the testimony to be taken in a setting
that, as nearly as practicable, preserves
all other aspects embodied in the right
of confrontation, but does not require
the witness to look directly upon the
defendant or to testify in his direct
physical presence; and (3) if § 9-102 is
implemented in the manner prescribed
by Wildermuth, the implementation
will not be deemed so violative of the
defendant's right of confrontation as
to constitute reversible error.

Id at 280-81, 544 A.2d at 799 (emphasis in
the original).
The procedure authorized in the
Maryland statute and used in this case did
not amount to the kind of face-ta-face confrontation that the Supreme Court held
was envisioned by the sixth amendment.
The child-witnesses testified from the
judge's chamber in the presence of a prosecutor, the lead defense attorney, and a
technician, while the judge and everyone
else remained in the courtroom. The proceedings were broadcast through a closed
circuit television setup, with Craig having
access to her attorney through a private
telephone line. The court of special appeals
conceded that if the confrontation requirement were absolute as interpreted by
Justice Scalia, the "procedure [used in
Craig] would not pass muster." Id at 281,
. 544 A.2d at 799. However, the court
emphasized that the requirement was not
so rigid since "neither the Supreme Court
nor the Maryland Court of Appeals-the
two courts that bind us-has ever held any
. aspect of the Confrontation Clause ... to
the absolute." Id
In Wildermuth, the court of appeals held
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that the right to face-to-face confrontation
was to be tempered by public policy considerations by which the state has a legitimate and compelling interest in
authorizing the procedure stated in section
9-102. Articulating that interest more specifically, the Craig court held that the state
has a two-fold interest in allowing the testimony of a child abuse victim to be given
over closed circuit television. Foremost is
the fact that if the child-witness is so
traumatized by the confrontation so as to
be unable to testify, the truth of the matter
may never be revealed. Secondly, the state
has a legitimate interest in protecting
children generally from such trauma. Id at
282-83, 544 A.2d at 800.
Craig's second argument was that the
trial court failed to follow the proper procedure stated in section 9-102. Citing Coy,
the court reemphasized that no individualized findings were made that the childwitnesses needed special protection in
providing face-to-face testimony when the
Supreme Court overturned that decision.
The court distinguished Wildermuth in
that that court's finding was based on testimony as to general perceptions on the difficulty children may have had testifying in
court with the alleged abuser's presence.
Id at 285, 544 A.2d at 801. In the instant
case, there was specific, focused testimony
on each child by trained personnel that the
child-witnesses would have extreme difficulty testifying in the presence of Craig
which satisfied the requirements of the statute.
Finally, the court addressed Craig's
assertion of right of presence. The Wilder·
muth court had also considered the argument that the closed circuit television
procedure authorized by section 9-102 vialated the defendant's common law and due
process right of presence, because the
witnesses and defendant were separated
during testimony. The Wildermuth court
rejected that contention since the defendant could hear the questions being asked
and answered, could see the proceedings,
and could readily communicate with his
attorney. Thus, the Wildermuth court held
that "[t]he statutory procedure did not
thwart a fair and just hearing in terms of
due process' and there was 'no violation of
[the defendant's] due process right to be
present.'" Id at 287-88, quoting Wilder·
muth, 310 Md. at 529, 530 A.2d at 291.
Craig had essentially the same setup and
was given ample opportunity to crossexamine the witnesses. Also, there was no
violation of the common law right of presence since it had been modified by statute.
The Court of Special Appeals of
Maryland has carved out an exception in
the sixth amendment's confrontation

clause concerning child abuse cases. Citing
strong public policy and the state's legitimate interest in protecting children generally from abuse, the court has made a
strong statement in both upholding the
accused's rights but also protecting childwitnesses from being traumatized by the
courtroom experience.

- George L Cintron

Geisz v. Greater Baltimore Medical
Center: SURVIVAL ACTIONS BASED
ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
ACCRUE UPON DISCOVERY AND
FRAUD STATUTE TOLLS TIME FOR
FILING WRONGFUL DEATH
ClAIMS
In Geisz v. Greater Baltimore Medical
Center, 313 Md. 301, 545 A.2d 658 (1988),

the Court of Appeals of Maryland held
that a wrongful death and survival action,
based on medical malpractice, accrues
upon discovery of fraud and that Md. Cts.
& Jud. Proc. Code Ann. 55-203 (1984
Repl. vol.) operates to toll the time for filing a wrongful death claim.
Plaintiff Elaine Geisz (Elaine), as personal representative of the estate of Steven
F. Geisz (Geisz) and as mother and next
friend of Steven Geisz, II, brought a survival action and a wrongful death claim
against Greater Baltimore Medical Center
(GBMC) and Dr. George J. Richards, Jr.,
alleging medical malpractice ten years after
Geisz died of Hodgkin's disease. The Circuit Court for Baltimore County entered
summary judgment in favor of the defendants finding that the survival action
accrued, as a matter of law, upon the death
of Geisz and that the Plaintiff failed to
show facts to support a finding of fraud to
toll the general three year statute of limitations to bring a wrongful death claim.
Assuming that the summary judgment
record could support a finding of fraud,
the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
nevertheless held that Elaine and Geisz
"by the exercise of ordinary diligence
should have discovered the fraud" more
than three years prior to the filing of the
wrongful death claim. Geisz v. GBMC, 71
Md. App. 538, 526 A.2d 635 (1987). The
Court of Appeals of Maryland granted certiorari to address the issue of whether the
survival claim and the wrongful death
action were time barred pursuant to 55203.
In 1971, Geisz had been diagnosed as suffering from Hodgkin's disease and had
been referred to Dr. Richards, who was
chief of radiation therapy at GBMC. At
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